no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics

The Problem of Oligopoly

December 31st, 2008

Jeopardy-style, answers first:

The answer is: A system that encourages oligopoly: government for business, and business for government. This is State Capitalism, and this is how it works: they get your money, in order to make you ever more dependent, ever more acquiescent.

The last few months of 2008 have been characterized by a severe economic downturn. People in the mainstream news are finally calling it a “recession”, not because of any newfound integrity, but rather because they’ve simply run out of euphemisms. The trouble became really apparent when people began to realize the banking system is broken, although some of us had been predicting this crash for several years.

In all fairness, I had no idea the extent to which it would wreak havoc on the economies, but there you have it: unintended consequences. I saw a boom that needed to bust in the housing market. But I didn’t know how far it would go.

Money flooded into real estate, and consequently into mortgage-backed securities, those securities were largely held by banks and insurance giants, and when the value of these securities dropped to zero, or became so toxic that it was impossible to value them accurately (so they were treated as if their value was zero) the whole house of cards began to fall apart.

Financial institutions like AIG were deemed too big to fail. The automotive manufacturers had their own epic fail, and are getting their own share of your hard-earned money.

This is what happens when consumption (rather than production) drives an economy. (And don’t give me any of that Keynesian Circular Flow bullshit.) Lenders now illiquid, or on the precipice thereof, stopped lending, and the economy which is built on a shaky foundation of consumption, grinds to a halt. Individuals, who for the better part of a decade had been sucking paper equity out of their mortgaged-to-the-hilt McMansions, now find themselves burdened with very real debt. Other monolithic corporations like the American automobile manufacturers, who for years have been selling vehicles as loss-leaders in order to profit through their financial arms, found that they have a hard time making that business model work when new money isn’t continually pumped into the economic system.

The very nature of these institutions implies a massively distorted one-way dependency:
An Insurance Giant doesn’t give a damn if one of its customers files bankruptcy or loses his job, but heaven forbid, a giant like AIG goes out of business, millions would be left uncovered, without affordable health insurance, and without much recourse. Whereas, every single automotive supplier needs the Big Three; the Big Three could give a damn if one or a hundred small machine shops closed their doors tomorrow, never to reopen. The asymmetric dependencies are problematic in their own right.

In a free market (the U.S.A. is not a free market) it is unlikely that any company could ever get as big as General Motors or AIG, for the simple fact that in order to grow, they would have to be profitable, and as long as they were profitable, there would be an incentive for others to compete with them. In a free market, where profit exists, small businesses should have easy access to capital.

Currently, regulations and restrictions prevent most people from effectively competing with large corporations. In a free market, any large corporation would be the necessary offshoot of an extremely beneficial product: in order to be big and profitable, you have to satisfy your customers in ways none of your competition can. General Motors, AIG, etc., none of these companies are now or were unique in this manner, so the question isn’t about their failure, rather it should be redirected.

The question is: Producing nothing meaningfully distinguishable from, nor more valuable than their competition, how in the world did these companies ever get so big.

For bonus points: what do we do about it?

Labor in the Auto Industry is Overpaid

December 21st, 2008

In Will the Auto Bailout Be Repaid? one commenter was very upset because I said that labor in the auto industry had been overpaid. I’m not picking favorites, notice that I accused all parties of having been overpaid. This is the result of a distorted market that allocates resources inefficiently. It rewards rent-seeking instead of value creation.

I’m not saying it was a conscious effort by Labor to rip people off, any more than it was a conscious effort by the contractors or the shareholders. It most likely wasn’t a conscious effort by any of the parties who benefited thereby.

As anecdotal evidence, I sometimes reference a $20,000 Christmas bonus at Chrysler, because I know people who received that amount in the early 1990s. I don’t know how representative that bonus was of their pool structure, but I was able to find some information on Ford and General motors with a quick Google search.


The bonuses referenced above, distributed as part of profit-sharing plans (and other perqs) may very well have been commensurate with the profit the Big Three was earning in the 1980s and 1990s.

Now, consider those bonuses in the 1980s and 1990s in another light:

The amount of money General Motors distributed in 1984 alone could’ve become $1B (at 5%) or $4B (at 11%). Had Ford retained the profit-sharing it distributed between 1983 and 1989, Ford woould currently be sitting on reserves of $5B (at 5%) or $13B (at 11%). They would have zero need for a taxpayer bailout.

But what if the profit was excessive? What if those companies weren’t really producing sustainable value?

I know, hindsight is 20/20. Nobody, including the employees, Labor at the time, had any way of really knowing this. So they took their share of those profits. I’m not at all suggesting that Labor should not share in the profits of the company. Of course Labor should be well-rewarded when the company is doing well. But labor should likewise suffer when the company is performing poorly: this means reduced hours, reduced wages, plant closings, line discontinuations, layoffs, etc.

To argue for the bailout, on personal and emotional grounds, is to suggest that labor should always be paid the same amount of money, even when they’re producing too many cars that nobody wants to buy, which is to say that this particular type of labor should be paid in excess of its worth, which is to say, it will be overpaid. But even a proper reading of the labor theory of value implies that value is not the same as cost.

There is simply no justification for maintainging stasis in the Auto Industry. There is no reason to believe that either the amount of vehicles they’re currently producing, the amount of resources they’re consuming, or the number of people currently employed, is now and forever will be the optimal allocation.

We’d be better off paying 1/2 of them to dig ditches, and paying the other 1/2 of them to fill those ditches back up. At least then, they wouldn’t be consuming massive amounts of scarce material resources that could more efficiently produce other, valuable goods and services.

How to Save the Auto Industry

December 19th, 2008

There are a number of recommendations to help “save” the Auto industry that would probably be more effective than the current Bridge Loan, but they won’t be tried, and they probably won’t even be suggested anywhere else. You’ll never hear anyone in the Mainstream Media saying that taxpayers (from whom the bailout money purportedly comes) should receive an equity share in the failing companies.

I previously suggested that the auto bailout will never be repaid, at least not in any meaningful sense. In reality, anyone who pays taxes should be able to claim an equity stake in the companies that have been bailed out with their money. This will never happen, but I think it would be preferable to the outright corporate welfare that is Teh Auto Bailout “Bridge Loan”.

It’s not the only thing that could work.

In 2007, General Motors paid $37B in taxes. With that in mind, here’s a solution to bail out the Auto Industry without taking money from the rest of us. Open the floodgates:

  • Eliminate all corporate taxes — all of them — any corporate income tax, however applied to big businesses or small ones. Wipe them all out, retroactive to January 1, 2008.
  • At the same time, eliminate all corporate welfare, including but not limited to preferential loans (which would reset to a fair market rate), tax deductions or credits, all direct subsidies, etc. Wipe them all out, retroactive to January 1, 2008.
  • Eliminate capital gains taxes and dividend payments, which depress the rate of economic growth and capital accumulation. Eliminate these taxes for everyone.

If General Motors can’t stay solvent with $37B of it’s own income, then there is no reason to give them any amount of other people’s money#.

Give the markets a taste of freedom. Instead of the Government siphoning our productivity into net-value destroyers like Archer Daniels Midland, instead of taking our money and giving it to Brontosaurs like General Motors, let people decide what will be produced, where, by whom, and in what quantities. Let the people keep the full rewards for those sacrifices they choose to make.

The Bailout is appealling to politicians because it’s the solution that allows the government to exercise the greatest amount of control over the industry, how it is run, how people work and are paid, and what is produced. It is backdoor fascism, which will be exacerbated if the funds already committed are not enough to forestall the Big Three’s demise.

Post script: Would now be a good time to mention that the Capital Gains taxes are going to increase in 2010?

no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics