no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics

FED to Buy Commercial Paper

October 8th, 2008

However the FED chooses to “stimulate” the economy, it’s all going to wind up as inflation. It’s all going to hurt the small, non-institutional investors and market participants. That means you, and me.

According to Financial Times, the FED will buy commercial paper, and “potentially unlimited amounts.”

This can not be good.

The Fed’s plan, which involves setting up a special purpose vehicle to buy potentially unlimited amounts of three-month debt from banks and non-financial companies, would expand its role as lender of last resort.

Unlimited amounts of commercial paper? Great! Let’s send false signals to everyone who is trying to plan and save for the future. As the Fed begins buying these securities, the demand (and hence, the prices) of these securities will be artificially overstated. This allows those with enough inside information, to sell into the artificial demand and profit handsomely, or at least, avoid incurring further losses. The vast majority of us do not have enough inside information.

“Mr Bernanke indicated that lower interest rates could be necessary,”

Necessary? Necessary for what?

Lower interest rates got us in to this mess, in the first place!

Lower interest rates, established by the government or a quasi-governmental agency like the Federal Reserve, encourage taking on additional debt at a time when many people have a great deal of uncertainty about the future. During these times, their inclinations are (rightly) to save money as a precautionary measure.

If we really need to take on additional debt, merely to stay above water in servicing the already-existing debt, then we’ve got one hell of a problem on our hands.

Privatizing Social Security, in Light of TEH BAILOUT

October 7th, 2008

Radley Balko responds to those who want to use the current financial meltdown as an argument against the privatization social security which constitutes a good portion of workers’ retirement accounts. For the unititiated, these “accounts” are now largely controlled and owned by the government under the fragile ponzi-scheme known as Social Security. Privatization, writes Balko, would allow millions of poor people “to accumulate inter-generational savings that could help their children or grandchildren escape the cycle of poverty.”

His opponents have argue that, had we private retirement accounts, they would’ve been decimated by the recent turmoil in financial markets, and that private investment is simply too risky. Mark Cuban is one such detractor.

I’ve found myself reading his weblog occasionally, he has some pretty smart things to say. Including, for instance, this gem (I get the feeling that Cuban didn’t know the half of what he was saying, more on this below) while blogging about last week’s orgy of Wall Street Bailouts:

And one last thing I have to mention. Does everyone realize how much bigger a disaster last week would have been had Social Security been privatized ? Please, let us all remember that when the topic comes up again in the future.

Lest anyone mistake my stance on “Social Security” privatization, let me put it front and center: Social Security is a fraud of the worst sorts and it should be abolished, forthwith. In this sense, I favor “privatization” of long-term care, a/k/a Social Security. How then, do I look favorably on Cuban’s position? And what was that bit about him not knowing the half of what he was saying?

Oh, I think he knew what he was saying, and I’m pretty sure he knew what he thought to mean. It’s quite likely that Cuban and I have vastly different assumptions about what is (or what ought to be) “private”, that is, were we to discuss the pros and cons of privatization, we’d be discussing two very different things. The hidden assumption in Cuban’s position is probably more-or-less: The market is free.

From which he concludes that privatizing Social Security would likely lead to more (and worse) of the same.

We can both look at the turmoil of the past week (or weeks, or months, or whatever) and agree that something is terribly wrong. But from those divergent premises, consensus is practically impossible.

This is because one unspoken assumption in my position is: the market is not free. This is evident by the fact that Government permits, encourages, and subsidizes businesses which are too big to fail.

If you go out of business, they take your fucking house. When they go out of business, you bail them out, prodded of course, by the cold steel barrel of a government gun. Am I the only one who sees something fantastically wrong with this arrangement?

To Cuban’s point, however, he is certainly correct on this: had all of our Social Security been tied up in Wall Street’s Toxic Assets we’d be up the proverbial creek, sans paddle. In a very, very bad way. If, and essentially only if, we had invested all of our money in financial companies in 1999, and were to retire tomorrow. This, of course, would not be the case for practically anyone. But I digress… Neither would I want the fund managers at Bear Stearns, or the financial gurus at Fannie Mae, managing my long-term security.

But I get the feeling that this is where our similarities end.

The whole mess is a product of a system in which profits are privatized (and how!) and losses are socialized, this was always implicitly the case. To be sure, AIG might not have known they’d be bailed out, Lehman might not have known they’d go bankrupt. But the industry as a whole could always be reasonably certain that Papa Government wouldn’t let them all be liquidated, couldn’t let go of the decades of accumulated power and paper wealth.

Balko’s clincher is matter-of-fact:

You think the stock market is risky? The federal government currently has obligations it will never be able to keep. And none of this accounts for trillion-dollar bank bailouts, inevitable wars or the new entitlements promised by the current candidates for present and future occupants of the White House.

Bravo!

The Moral Hazard of Sub-Prime

October 7th, 2008

The moral hazard of the subprime market for loans is essentially this: Sooner or later…the only people left to borrow money are those to whom no sound banker would lend a dime under ordinary circumstances.

With that in mind, one of my professors from Grad School e-mailed me the following article in PDF form the other day, which I’ve since seen floating around the Econosphere. It is a NYT article discusses the moral hazard of Fannie/Freddie moving in to the subprime market, from September, 1999:

In moving, even tentatively, into this new area of lending, Fannie Mae is taking on significantly more risk, which may not pose any difficulties during flush economic times. But the government subsidized corporation may run into trouble in an economic downturn, promting a government rescue similar to that of the savings and loan industry in the 1980’s.

I’ve been singing that tune for a few years now, as I previously blogged in 2006, everyone thought they’d be one of the lucky ones who could beat the mortgage bubble.

With all the low-interest mortgage options that have been available – especially due to the prevalence of variable rate mortgages, I think it’s fair to assume that alot of people who couldn’t afford to buy (or otherwise invest in) real estate used the ARM to keep their payments within the realm of affordability, on the expectation that when the ARM expired, they’d be able to sell it. Sell it to whom? Everyone else in the market bought on the same speculation – or refinanced on the same speculation.

Economics, for the most part, is not rocket science. Incentives matter. Price controls don’t work. Supply and demand ultimately prevail.

I should qualify, that sub-prime lending, in and of itself, is not prone to any particular moral hazard. In a free market (we do not have, nor did we in 1999, a free market) interest rates match time preferences of borrowers and lenders. In a free market, risky business pays a higher price, which discourages behavior prone to risk, and encourages people to reduce the risks within their power to control. Only when the market is manipulated, when the costs of doing such business are hidden from plain (and examined) view, when the risks are concealed to the borrowers, does moral hazard begin to enter the picture.

And what a mess it leaves, eh?

no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics