no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics

On Social Insurance Programs

May 1st, 2007

Any form of “social insurance,” whether it be flood insurance, universal health care, etc., represents what can only be properly described as a forced transference of risk from those unwilling and/or unable to retain or share that risk, to those who otherwise are willing to either retain or avoid that risk. The simplest case to make, perhaps is catastrophe insurance, which type of insurance is said to be privately uninsurable in general, because the potential losses accruing cannot be forecast accurately. That is to say, that in any given year, we may have a long-run average loss from floods, or hurricanes. Or we may have mega-catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina. Or we may have relatively few hurricanes, like 2006 saw. The expected losses cannot be calculated within a meaningful margin, because the variance is too great, or the sample is too small or not representative, or both.

Do you think you could buy a term-life policy, if not for the general accuracy of mortality tables? Of course, you could not. Term-life insurance works because in any given year, the actual mortality rates are very close to the expected long-run mortality rates. But we have no such accurate means of predicting losses due to floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. A single flood may wipe out every insured property – or it may barely scathe any of them.

Moreover, there are areas which we know with some (or great) certainty, are prone to flooding. These areas can undoubtedly be avoided by anyone unwilling to bear the risk personally, or the risk can be shared mutually among those who do choose to live in those locales. By retaining the risk, we understand that any individual who builds a house on a flood plain, may be subject to a financial loss up-to-and-including the full amount of his capital assets located there. If you own a $300,000 condo on the Mississippi Delta, and a flood wipes out your building, you’ve lost $300K. But attempting to share the risk via mutual is slightly problematic, as a mutual insurer is subject to the same sample and forecasting problems described in brief, above. Even a mutual insurer is not immune to the chance that each insured may very well be called upon to bear the full burden, that is, risk will not necessarily be shared under a mutual and the individuals suffering losses will be called upon to bear the full burden thereof. I’m not sure either is more advantageous than the other.

But this is not, contrary to popular belief, justification for “social insurance” or government-provided flood insurance. It is actually strong evidence that one ought not live in such an area if he is incapable of retaining the full amount of risk to which he is subject.

So, should anybody live in areas prone to flooding? Should any businesses operate facilities there?

Actually, these situations can easily be accommodated. Because in the absence of social insurance, we can surmise that the property values and land rents in those areas would be significantly lower than they are at present. This would allow a greater number of individuals (or firms) to retain the full amount of risk, because the potential for monetary loss would be markedly lower.

Social insurance programs necessarily (and simultaneously) stimulate a morale hazard, by reducing the actual exposure of those most prone to the particular risk being “insured.” But such programs, like most government programs, have the propensity to be self-perpetuating. The more people who move to such areas as a result of the morale hazard, the more disastrous the claims – as a result of inflated property valuation – and concurrently, the more urgent the need for the continuance of such programs.

I can find no justification for social insurance, so-called, which forces those wise enough to avoid a risk altogether, to bear its burden for the certain benefit of others.

Women & Insurance

April 25th, 2007

As long as I’m conducting Women’s Studies 101, I’ll give you this tidbit that I saw on the news the other night. A web-search turned up the following, via MSNBC:

“High-deductible plans punish women for having breasts and uteruses and having babies,” said Dr. Steffie Woolhandler, the study’s lead author…Women’s costs are higher because women need mammograms, cervical cancer vaccine, Pap tests, birth control and pregnancy-related services that men do not.

Nobody is being punished: Women’s costs are higher because they are biologically predisposed to certain conditions. Is this fair? I don’t know – life isn’t fair, in general. But it certainly would not be any more fair to force men to subsidize women’s mammograms, or for abstinent women to subsidize birth control pills for others. The issues at hand are simply not insurable risks, and to categorize them as such, under some mistaken notion of fairness, is ridiculous; most of them are not actually insurable in any sense, except where people not subject to the risk are forced to bear a disproportional burden.

For example, the potential need for birth control medication is definitively not insurable, because the insured party has a sufficient amount of – if not total – control over whether she needs it. Nobody accidentally needs “the pill.” And one of the fundamental principles of insurance is that we know, or assume to know with great certainty, the probability of risk to which a group of individuals may be subject, but with regards to any particular individual, we know nothing. But there is almost no randomness in “getting pregnant.” It is nearly always a planned outcome, where the only thing left to chance is whether or when conception will occur, after the decision has been made to try and conceive. The only reason any fiscally responsible insurer would cover birth control for women, is to reduce exposure to the peril of pregnancy, that is, to reduce or eliminate unplanned pregnancies, the expenses of which the law requires that they cover. If the law did not require such coverage, it would not be provided – or – to the extent that it would be provided, the cost would approximate the actual cost of risk retention, because anyone who didn’t want to pay for that amount of insurance simply wouldn’t carry that sort of insurance.

But certain elements are insurable. For instance, you could almost certainly take out a policy before planning pregnancy, which would cover you in the event of some catastrophic loss – for instance, the baby is born extremely prematurely, or with a dangerous condition, and requires expensive incubation and medical attendance. These things happen infrequently, and are expensive enough, that a great many people would likely purchase such policies. This is what insurance is designed to do – it is not designed to pay you for an outcome which you desire!

As far as certain other perils are concerned (e.g., breast cancer, &c.) it is not correct for people of markedly dissimilar risks to bear the burden of providing this sort of insurance coverage. Certainly, the risk of breast cancer in women is small enough that it can reasonably be pooled among women. The risk of breast cancer for men is markedly smaller, and just as it makes no sense to pool your risk of becoming disabled at work with the risk to which a professional football player is exposed, it makes no sense to pool men and women together with regards to these particular expenses.

And since the attendant examinations like mammograms (for cancer) or birth-control (for pregnancy) are so regular within the particular pool, no insurance can properly cover them, because we know that every woman of certain age will require one such examination annually, and so the price of that “coverage,” to the extent that it is covered, will be entirely built in to the premium. Adverse selection ensures that when conditions are such that an identifiable subset of a population will certainly suffer the loss, no pooling is effective, because those not subject to the risk will withdraw from the program, seeking to be insured among others with similar risks.

To those who might argue that certain features, preventative care, would be provided by insurers in order to reduce their exposure… Perhaps this is true. But it’s not necessarily so. What’s more likely is that the price of your premium would be reduced if you agreed to certain preventative measures – just like you may receive discounts on your auto policy for ABS, passive restraints, and theft-deterrent systems. The price mechanism ensures a demarcation between those willing to bear their own risks and those who are not, and also between those subject to the risks, and those immune from those risks.

Just as you can’t insure yourself against the “risk” of suicide, you cannot factually insure yourself against the “risk” of anything, the certain frequency of which you control. For brevity’s sake, I’ll stop here – but if you’ve got any questions, feel free to leave them in the comments section below.

Disagree with me. I dare you!

April 12th, 2007

For instance, I’m in a social setting talking with acquaintances, one of whom is lauding the Scandinavian (and to an extent, Canadian) maternity programs. Some countries give you a year or more off when you beget a brat. And the person with whom I’m talking starts mentioning how “wonderful” it is that such a program exists. “Wondeful? For whom?” I ask. “For you? What about me? What about John in accounting, or Steve in shipping & receiving? What about the girl in the cube next to you, who now finds her workload doubled in your absence? Is it wondeful for us?”

Of course it’s fucking not wonderful for us.

And the salient point which must be made here, the question that needs to be asked, is by what right do you exercise this power? By what right can you legitimately claim to force me to work for you? And, like just about everything else, your argument boils down to brute force. Because it’s popular.

And eventually, after several such arguments, one gets slapped with the “disagreeable” label, as in, why are you so disagreable? Why do you have to always be right? &c.

Now, I don’t have to always be right. As long as the other people stop being wrong.

Generally, I disagree with you when I believe that you are wrong. Maintaining my position in the face of your arguments does not make me any more disagreable than you. After all, you don’t agree with me, either. So, for starters, when you open the can of worms, do not expect that you will be able to just “let it be” if the conversation turns heated a moment later. I recognize that the desire to do so is coward-speak for “I’m right, but I’ll let you think that you’re right – if I can only convince you to stop exploding my arguments, I’ll leave here and you’ll feel like you lost.”

No, I refuse to fucking play that game. Which, consequently is why I don’t talk politics with strangers if it can at all be avoided. In the event that discourse ensues, it very well may be the case, that I’m Jekyll & Hyde-ing into “dickhead-contrarian-anarchist” mode, but that’s only because I’m even more convinced that you’re wrong, and you’re obviously neglecting reason, so I’m appealing to brute force and volume, with which your persistent denial of reason indicates that you are quite familiar, since it’s your modus operandi. Now, I’m not going to beat the piss out of you because you’re disagreeing with me.

But, by your (specious) reasoning, It’d be ok if I did.

no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics