no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics

The Government Hates Competition

November 16th, 2007

If it relies upon the confiscation of a few million dollars worth of privately minted (and legal) specie-backed currency, what does this say about the viability and legitimacy of fractional-reserve banking, in general?

[At] about 8:00 this morning a dozen FBI and Secret Service agents raided the Liberty Dollar office in Evansville.

For approximately six hours they took all the gold, all the silver, all the platinum and almost two tons of Ron Paul Dollars that where (sic) just delivered last Friday. They also took all the files, all the computers and froze our bank accounts.

It is important to consider that the Liberty Dollar is not legal tender, which means that anyone who doesn’t want to accept it in exchange is not obligated to do so. The Federal Reserve notes are still the only form of money which must be accepted “for all debts, public and private even when voluntary contracts stipulate otherwise.

If you don’t have a problem with the idea of fractional-reserve banking, what do you think about such confiscations, and how can they be justified?

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More thoughts from Cap’n Arbyte.

Sound Familiar?

October 29th, 2007

Allow me to quote liberally – it’s not often that I find an editorial in USA Today or another major outlet which basically paraphrases everything I’ve ever said about natural disasters and socialized “insurance.” Note: Bad copy has not been edited.

Butone thing that the wildfires share with Katrina is that both naturaldisasters were made worse by the propensity of people to build homes inhigh-risk areas. Katrina’s economic impact was magnified by developmentalong the vulnerable Gulf Coast. Similarly, the wildfires have beenparticularly brutal in newly developed communities in fire-pronescrublands and dry pine forests.

A USA TODAY analysis Thursday found that 55,000 people have moved into new communities hit by the fires — just since 2000. Building in fire-prone areas has been running at twice the state average. And one devastated community in Orange County has tripled its population in the past seven years to 22,329.

Something is obviously wrong here. Public safety is one of the most important functions of state and local governments, which can and should do more to discourage people from moving to dangerous areas, and minimizing the consequences when they do.

To some degree, market forces can help address the problem. Higher homeowners’ insurance rates discourage building in unsafe areas. But this approach only goes so far.

In the Gulf, it’s impossible to even talk of market forces because they have been distorted by the federal flood insurance program, which encourages people to build in flood and hurricane-prone areas by offering them insurance and rates well below what is necessary to cover the costs of catastrophes…

And so on. If you’ve read my posts on this sort of thing, USAToday will all sound vaguely familiar to you.

Forest Fires & Broken Windows

October 25th, 2007

I knew it wouldn’t take long for the broken window to come into play…

No economist worth his salt would say something like this:

“In the odd nature of economic accounting, this will probably be a stimulus,” said Alan Gin, a University of San Diego economist. “There will be a huge amount of rebuilding in the next couple of years, financed by insurance payments.”

Nobody suggests that hurricane Katrina was a boon for the Delta economy — because it wasn’t. Nobody suggests that New York City has benefitted from terrorists taking down the Twin Towers — because it hasn’t. Nobody believes that World War I (and II, for that matter) stimulated the global economy — because they didn’t. The point I’m trying to make here, is that we are perfectly capable of blowing shit up, and that if blowing shit up was a viable path to economic well-being, we certainly wouldn’t have to wait for a forest fire or a flash flood or a terrorist attack to bring it about.

To be fair, the other economists cited in the Times’ article were not complete R-tards. But Mr. Gin, presumably a professor or an associate professor of economics has flunked the final, as it were. If the “huge amount of rebuilding” is really the boon that some people believe it is, does Mr. Gin suggest self-imposed destruction?

Not unless he’s a complete fucking idiot. Why do I say that about him?

Because economic accounting always considers opportunity costs. (For a more detailed exposition, see Bastiat’s What is Seen and What is Not Seen)

Mr. Gin and those like him fail to recognize those things which they cannot see. Of course I don’t dispute that homebuilders in SoCal will probably make a few extra bucks in the next year or two. And I don’t dispute that most of that money will be financed by insurance settlements. But the relevant consideration is what that money could’ve otherwise been used for, had people not lost literally everything they own. It would’ve been distributed to the insurance companies as profits, to the shareholders companies in the form of dividends. Some of it would’ve been reinvested in the company or in other secure assets to hedge against future catastrophes. It would’ve been spent on capital goods for the insurers, and consumption goods (primarily) for the recipients of dividends.

After the fire, the payouts, and the rebuilding, all we have are the houses – which in the absence of a catastrophic fire, we already had. Mr. Gin “sees” the demand for rebuilding. He sees the glazier, who is encouraged by broken windows. But he dare not suggest that we go about breaking windows merely to benefit the glazier. He does not see what other enjoyments might be demanded, what other industries encouraged in its stead, nor does he account for the benefit of those whose homes are ruined who might’ve otherwise enjoyed something more.

The reader must apply himself to observe that there are not only two people, but three, in the little drama that I have presented. The one, James Goodfellow, represents the consumer, reduced by destruction to one enjoyment instead of two. The other, under the figure of the glazier, shows us the producer whose industry the accident encourages. The third is the shoemaker (or any other manufacturer) whose industry is correspondingly discouraged by the same cause. It is this third person who is always in the shadow, and who, personifying what is not seen, is an essential element of the problem. It is he who makes us understand how absurd it is to see a profit in destruction.

Bastiat is rolling in his grave…

no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics