no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics

Bad Economics

May 30th, 2007

I’ve noticed that a lot of bad economics is based on some notion of the “socialist man,” who, according to Marx and Engels, was to rise from the lifeless body of the greedy capitalist who sold his hangman the very noose that hanged him. Or something like that. The “socialist man” is a paragon of virtue and self-sacrifice; he is not beholden to the incentive for personal, financial, or material gain – his only incentive is the abstract community, and he will do anything to further whatever interests are the community’s.

But “socialist man” is no more real than the orthodox “Homo economus,” whose is basically a Benthamite, utility-maximizing automaton. Crafting policy, based on either assumption, or with the intent of forcing man closer to these ideals, is bound to fail. Always, and everywhere – because values, tastes and preferences are subjective, and individual results may vary, unintended consequences usually follow. Anti-trust laws are the breeding grounds for politically connected oligopoly. Prohibitions encourage corruption and black-markets. Price restrictions cause shortages, from either a demand or supply effect, &c.

And there is no more severe price restriction than an effective ceiling of “zero.” How many donuts would the baker bake if he could only give them away for free? How many panes of glass would the glazier make if compensation for his time, effort, and knowledge was zero? How many shoes would the cobbler make for naught?

Better yet – knowing these limitations – who would be induced to enter into the trades mentioned above? How many bakers, glaziers, and cobblers would be available to supply the world’s demand for their wares?

It should come as no surprise to anyone, that the waiting lists for organ transplants are often longer than the donee’s life expectancy. After all, if you choose to donate a kidney to a stranger, you get a hug, a handshake, or a bouquet. He gets a new lease on life. It is not surprising that there are very few people willing to make this sacrifice – noble or virtuous as it may be:

If we allowed a free, or even a semi-free, market for kidneys, then although we might all be less “noble,” at least some of us would also be less dead.

Nobility is also subjective. The consequences of reality, however, are not.

On Social Insurance Programs

May 1st, 2007

Any form of “social insurance,” whether it be flood insurance, universal health care, etc., represents what can only be properly described as a forced transference of risk from those unwilling and/or unable to retain or share that risk, to those who otherwise are willing to either retain or avoid that risk. The simplest case to make, perhaps is catastrophe insurance, which type of insurance is said to be privately uninsurable in general, because the potential losses accruing cannot be forecast accurately. That is to say, that in any given year, we may have a long-run average loss from floods, or hurricanes. Or we may have mega-catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina. Or we may have relatively few hurricanes, like 2006 saw. The expected losses cannot be calculated within a meaningful margin, because the variance is too great, or the sample is too small or not representative, or both.

Do you think you could buy a term-life policy, if not for the general accuracy of mortality tables? Of course, you could not. Term-life insurance works because in any given year, the actual mortality rates are very close to the expected long-run mortality rates. But we have no such accurate means of predicting losses due to floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. A single flood may wipe out every insured property – or it may barely scathe any of them.

Moreover, there are areas which we know with some (or great) certainty, are prone to flooding. These areas can undoubtedly be avoided by anyone unwilling to bear the risk personally, or the risk can be shared mutually among those who do choose to live in those locales. By retaining the risk, we understand that any individual who builds a house on a flood plain, may be subject to a financial loss up-to-and-including the full amount of his capital assets located there. If you own a $300,000 condo on the Mississippi Delta, and a flood wipes out your building, you’ve lost $300K. But attempting to share the risk via mutual is slightly problematic, as a mutual insurer is subject to the same sample and forecasting problems described in brief, above. Even a mutual insurer is not immune to the chance that each insured may very well be called upon to bear the full burden, that is, risk will not necessarily be shared under a mutual and the individuals suffering losses will be called upon to bear the full burden thereof. I’m not sure either is more advantageous than the other.

But this is not, contrary to popular belief, justification for “social insurance” or government-provided flood insurance. It is actually strong evidence that one ought not live in such an area if he is incapable of retaining the full amount of risk to which he is subject.

So, should anybody live in areas prone to flooding? Should any businesses operate facilities there?

Actually, these situations can easily be accommodated. Because in the absence of social insurance, we can surmise that the property values and land rents in those areas would be significantly lower than they are at present. This would allow a greater number of individuals (or firms) to retain the full amount of risk, because the potential for monetary loss would be markedly lower.

Social insurance programs necessarily (and simultaneously) stimulate a morale hazard, by reducing the actual exposure of those most prone to the particular risk being “insured.” But such programs, like most government programs, have the propensity to be self-perpetuating. The more people who move to such areas as a result of the morale hazard, the more disastrous the claims – as a result of inflated property valuation – and concurrently, the more urgent the need for the continuance of such programs.

I can find no justification for social insurance, so-called, which forces those wise enough to avoid a risk altogether, to bear its burden for the certain benefit of others.

Fire Protection as a Public Good

April 25th, 2007

The more you look into “public goods,” the more historical evidence you find that suggests that they weren’t always as “public” as we’ve been led to believe, viz., we are taught that certain goods or services cannot be produced on the market, therefore the government must provide them, and therefore taxation is justified in securing the necessary funds to operate the programs that provide them. I previously examined the Lighthouse Problem, after coming across an interview on the subject with Ronald Coase, at Reason a while back. Tonight, I learned about another example

In 1666, the City of London burned to the ground. Shortly thereafter, an Englishman by the name of Nicholas Unless-Jesus-Christ-Had-Died-For-Thee-Thou-Hadst-Been-Damned Barbon (seriously) is generally credited with creating the first sort of fire insurance:

Afterwards, insurance companies formed private fire brigades to protect their clients’ property. Insurance brigades would only fight fires at buildings the company insured. These buildings were identified by a badge or sign.

Today, most properties are insured against fire, either by covenant or regulation, so the free-rider problem is pretty much non-existent.

So, why do we pay taxes for this sort of thing today?

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UPDATE: Russ Roberts, from CafeHayek e-mailed me today to point me to one possible answer: Rent Seeking.  You can read Fred S. McChesney’s “Smoke and Errors” over at Econlib.

Thanks, Russ!

no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics