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Krugman’s Prescription for an Ailing Economy: More Spending!

December 29th, 2008

Paul Krugman is desperate for answers; in Fifty Herbert Hoovers, he asks how we got here, (“here”, of course, being a severe recession) and offers the typical Keynesian stimulus prescription to get us out of here, and back to a more prosperous time and place. After all, we didn’t suddenly become less productive, did we?

Think about it … Our capacity hasn’t been diminished; our workers haven’t lost their skills; our technological know-how is intact. Why can’t we keep doing good things?

It’s a damn good question, and unfortunately the only sentence of any worth in the entire editorial. I’ve recently asked the same question:

Jobs, wealth, productivity, capital: all squandered, destroyed. And now they say, “The free market has failed you!” Now, they say, “You need Government more than ever before!” — How 80,000 Jobs Disappeared, 24 Nov. 2008

The difference is that Krugman views the government, which failed to prevent this recession, which failed to protect its citizens from economic cataclysm, as the appropriate solution, and since I view it as the proximate cause of this (and almost all) human suffering, I reel at the idea of giving it yet more power, more control over us. Where I argue for free markets which permit or encourage people to create and develop real and sustainable wealth, Krugman wants to see more public spending.

No modern American president would repeat the fiscal mistake of 1932, in which the federal government tried to balance its budget in the face of a severe recession.

I would argue that no modern economist, especially not a Nobel Laureate, should look only at the fiscal policies of the depression era, in prescribing a solution for the current recession. And that furthermore, a Nobel Laureate, one would presume, should be able to examine the crash of 1929 and the subsequent depression, and identify the policies that created the downturn in the first place, primarily the massive inflation of the money supply from 1921 to 1929 (an annualized growth of 7.7%).

Krugman can’t even set up a good Straw Man!

Some policies pursued during (and in order to alleviate) the Great Depression would include, but are not limited to inflation: massive public works spending, farm subsidies, tariffs on foreign goods, maintaining wage rates/price controls, raising taxes, etc.

When people needed desperately to be relived of governmental burdens, the dead weight of government rose from 16.4% to 21.5% of the gross private product…. [President Hoover had ammassed] the largest peacetime deficiet yet known to American history. — Murray N. Rothbard. America’s Great Depression, 5th Edition, pp263-264

What is it, with the Keynesian fetish for “consumption”? Why do they harbor such ill-will towards those who would save their money, especially in uncertain times? Like many economists, Krugman maintains a variant of the “underconsumption” theory of depression, private investors and individuals, they say, simply aren’t investing enough, or spending as much as they should be spending. Krugman, for instance, argues that:

It’s true that the economy is currently shrinking. But that’s the result of a slump in private spending. It makes no sense to add to the problem by cutting public spending, too.

Since people aren’t spending enough, businesses lose money, and people are laid off, so they spend less, and the downward cycle continues. Therefore, it is necessary for government to make up the difference through public spending on ditch-diggers and work camps.

And, one could almost make an argument for public spending, had the public any money to spend, but it doesn’t. Not at the state level, and not at the national level. Krugman’s advice, to “spend” now, is like telling the unemployed person not to get a job for minimum wage, but instead to load up his high-interest Capital One card with debt. It’s telling someone who is in financial distress, that the only way to remedy what ails him, is to spend more money that he doesn’t have.

The Keynesian prescription for unemployment rests on the persistence of a “money illusion” among workers … Governmental inflation, then, is supposed to eliminate unemployment by bringing about such a fall in real wage rates. — Rothbard, p. 37

Since the government simply doesn’t have any money, they can only begin spending on public works by raising taxes or inflating the money supply, the latter being the preferred (and easiest) solution. But, inflation has a price: it decimates savings, renders business and economic forecasting essentially impotent, and through teh dread malinvestment, causes resources to be used up in the production of unwanted goods and services.

Just as no man ever spent his way to a fortune,ever made himself sustainably wealthy by consuming, by destroying valuable goods and resources, and no nation will ever find prosperity along that path, either.

Asking for more spending when the money is not there, is pure nonsense. Pure, fucking nonsense.

Ever wonder why nobody trusts an economist?

Malinvestment: A Primer

December 24th, 2008

I’ve lately been occupied with a theory piece, on the idea of “malinvestment” which is central to the Austrian theory of business cycles. Malinvestment is a fairly complicated phenomenon, and many people have a hard time understanding the concept (i.e., it’s not “over-investment”), if they don’t dismiss it outright.

I’ve broken it into four topics:

I. What is malinvestment? A brief definition of the idea.
II. What causes malinvestment? Explaining what forces in the economy cause malinvestment.
III. How does malinvestment happen? Explaining the process by which malinvestment infects an economy, and is later discovered.
IV. Why does malinvestment cause a “bust”? Explaining why the “boom” phase is (and must be) followed by a “bust”.

The idea of “malinvestment” was put forth by Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek. The theory has been refined by Mark Skousen (in his book, The Structure of Production) and Roger Garrison (in an excellent PowerPoint presentation on Sustainable and Unsustainable Growth.)

What follows is the revised version of a draft, titled “On Malinvestment, How? and Why?“, which I posted at Mises.org forums asking for feedback & criticism. It was fairly well-received by the readers and moderators, alike, but I have taken some time to re-organize and fine-tune it, although I still consider it a work-in-progress, subject to future revision.

I. What is Malinvestment?

A simple, working definition would be something like, “Malinvestment is the systematic allocation of productive factors (i.e., land, labor, capital) towards the production of goods or services for which insufficient demand exists.” It is not “overinvestment“, nor is it “underinvestment.” It may very well be just the right amount, it’s just not allocated appropriately. Malinvestment is at its core an examination of inflation and its effects on the economy:

  1. Inflation causes resources to be allocated towards, and consumed (i.e., destroyed) by the production of goods and/or services that people ultimately don’t want. To the extent that this occurs, it represents a real diminution of material wealth.
  2. Inflation creates an incentive to spend more and invest/save less than that ratio which would be in accord with their true time preference. To the extent that this occurs, values are “realized” or “fulfilled” sooner than would be optimal, this too represents a real sacrifice of (future) well-being.

II. What causes Malinvestment?

Malinvestment occurs when, as Rothbard put it, a central bank has “tampered with the moorings” of the economy, when the price mechanism has been violated by inflation; discouraging investment (which increases our future productivity) and simultaneously encouraging more immediate consumption, inflation destroys an economy from within.

In order to understand the problem, it is necessary to understand that an interest rate is fundamentally an inter-temporal price: present goods in terms of future goods, and also that consumption is not merely the satisfaction of needs, but also as the destruction of previously accumulated wealth; that which is consumed is no longer available to satisfy other needs. In order to optimize the satisfaction of human wants, its necessary for prices to (as accurately as possible) reflect genuine conditions.

The function of price is to provide signals to market participants: when, where, in what quantity, and towards what ends should resources be allocated. These signals are valuable information that market participants use in directing the resources at their disposal, whether they be cash, credit, finished products, works-in-progress, labor, etc. Interference with prices, therefore sends inaccurate signals to investors, entrepreneurs, consumers, borrowers, and lenders. Inflation is an interference with the price system, since it makes available to certain parties more money, and depresses the rate of return on investments/savings.

When new money is introduced, what causes the existing ratio of prices to change, as a result? Someone, somewhere in the economy receives the new money before anyone else, and before the increase in MS is known. This actor then has at his disposal more money than he would otherwise have. Competing for scarce resources with others, who do not have the benefit of this new money, he bids up the prices, and takes them from where, in an unfettered market, they would be more optimally allocated.

Prices just began to rise, and they did not rise uniformly. Everyone else is playing catch-up. Non-institutional investors are always the losers.

III. How does Malinvestment happen?

When new money is introduced, demand appears to have increased, as manifested by higher prices. These prices tell people “make more stuff.” Seeing a higher price being paid for certain goods, it appears that a profit to may be made in that market. Responding to the signal, people begin now to overwork their assets, or perhaps to invest in assets that will enable them to be more productive tomorrow. New money typically manifests itself in two distinct manners:

  1. First, money enters the system through the banks, who create the money ex nihilo and distribute to businesses in the form of loans (debt money), which spend it on higher-order capital goods, lengthening the structure of production. Longer time-horizon projects are more interest-rate sensitive than short-term projects. All else being equal, a lower interest rate (caused by more money in circulation, will encourage production processes that are more roundabout, take longer to complete, etc.
  2. A secondary effect of the new money is demand for consumption goods, is not due to the new money being spent, but rather the new money’s effects on the structure of interest rates. All else being equal, a higher interest rate is an incentive to “save” or “invest”. Iif the rate is forced lower by credit expansion, then marginal lenders/savers are crowded out of the market. It follows that the artificially low interest rates due to inflation cause a diminution in real investment (i.e., deferred consumption), and consumption rises.

Malinvestment occurs because businesses are investing in more capital goods at the same time that consumers (e.g., employees now with higher wages, or businesses with more purchasing power) are demanding more consumption goods. The consumer demand initially appears greater, as evidenced by the higher prices caused by more money competing for the same amount of existing goods/services, which apparently justifies undertaking the new investments in longer, roundabout processes. The only time longer, more roundabout processes ought to be undertaken is when consumption is deferred for the future. Otherwise, what we have is businesses embarking on longer-term projects, even as consumers are spending their money on more immediate consumption.

IV. Why Does Malinvestment Cause a “Bust”

Higher prices being generally reflections of the increased money supply, and not of any fundamental change in consumer preferences (if the latter is the case, the former makes it more difficult to ascertain), inflation is rising prices due to a rising money supply. As new money eventually works its way through the system, people discover that they over-utilized their productive assets yesterday (and therefore can’t produce as much today) or that they invested in assets in an attempt to increase capacity to accommodate a phantom increase in demand.

When these facts are eventually revealed, many investments are shown as unprofitable and must be liquidated, and in either case we are made worse off.

It requires previously accumulated capital (higher order goods, not pure debt obligations) to facilitate the production of more consumer products (lower order goods) without depleting the existing capital stock. In order to have more today, it is imperative to have invested in productivity, made some sacrifice towards that end, yesterday. This process does not work in reverse, so since the consumption fueling the “demand” stimulated by inflation wasn’t matched with a previous investment in productivity, it’s likely to be a net value destroyer; remember that “consumption” is just a polite and roundabout way of saying that something valuable is being destroyed/consumed.

If economic growth is not financed by previously accumulated capital, but instead mortgaged by future productivity, the systemic boom/bust phase to which we are accustomed is a necessary consequence.

How to Save the Auto Industry

December 19th, 2008

There are a number of recommendations to help “save” the Auto industry that would probably be more effective than the current Bridge Loan, but they won’t be tried, and they probably won’t even be suggested anywhere else. You’ll never hear anyone in the Mainstream Media saying that taxpayers (from whom the bailout money purportedly comes) should receive an equity share in the failing companies.

I previously suggested that the auto bailout will never be repaid, at least not in any meaningful sense. In reality, anyone who pays taxes should be able to claim an equity stake in the companies that have been bailed out with their money. This will never happen, but I think it would be preferable to the outright corporate welfare that is Teh Auto Bailout “Bridge Loan”.

It’s not the only thing that could work.

In 2007, General Motors paid $37B in taxes. With that in mind, here’s a solution to bail out the Auto Industry without taking money from the rest of us. Open the floodgates:

  • Eliminate all corporate taxes — all of them — any corporate income tax, however applied to big businesses or small ones. Wipe them all out, retroactive to January 1, 2008.
  • At the same time, eliminate all corporate welfare, including but not limited to preferential loans (which would reset to a fair market rate), tax deductions or credits, all direct subsidies, etc. Wipe them all out, retroactive to January 1, 2008.
  • Eliminate capital gains taxes and dividend payments, which depress the rate of economic growth and capital accumulation. Eliminate these taxes for everyone.

If General Motors can’t stay solvent with $37B of it’s own income, then there is no reason to give them any amount of other people’s money#.

Give the markets a taste of freedom. Instead of the Government siphoning our productivity into net-value destroyers like Archer Daniels Midland, instead of taking our money and giving it to Brontosaurs like General Motors, let people decide what will be produced, where, by whom, and in what quantities. Let the people keep the full rewards for those sacrifices they choose to make.

The Bailout is appealling to politicians because it’s the solution that allows the government to exercise the greatest amount of control over the industry, how it is run, how people work and are paid, and what is produced. It is backdoor fascism, which will be exacerbated if the funds already committed are not enough to forestall the Big Three’s demise.

Post script: Would now be a good time to mention that the Capital Gains taxes are going to increase in 2010?

no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics