no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics

What is Time Preference?

June 26th, 2008

A while back, in Comments on Comments #13, The Coast responded to discussion about Allodial title. Among my charges is the argument that “governments don’t have discount rates.”

[A]s far as the government not having a discount rate isn’t quite true. The fed rate (the rate in which the loan out money to banks and I would assume other countries) is basically the discount rate and you could just take the 200 year average as a basic assumption of their future fed rate if it came down to it.

The Fed has been around for less than a century, so there is no 200-year average we could assume. But let’s not argue semantic details. The important confusion here is that the Fed’s “discount rate,” through which it engages in open market operations, is not the same as a discount rate. It is colloquially referred to as the discount rate, or the discount-window rate, and is rate at which the Federal Reserve “lends” money to its member banks (i.e., all of them).

A market interest rate, to be differentiated from the Fed Funds rate, is comprised of such a natural interest rate as accurately reflects the time preference of individuals (i.e., future goods in terms of present goods), a default premium, an inflationary expectation premium, and probably some other factor that I’m overlooking. Lenders, in order to be induced to part with their accumulated real savings for a period of time, charge interest on loans in order to compensate them for the risk of a borrower’s default, the risk of inflation wiping out their gains, and so on. But all of these components of interest can theoretically be arbitraged away.

Take note, that even if a borrower were 100% guaranteed, even if there were sound money and no threat of inflation, an interest rate would still manifest itself through the discounting of future with regards to present. Time preference can not be arbitraged away. Although the degree to which time preference manifests itself is individually unique, some degree of preference for present consumption over future consumption is axiomatic#.

The discount rate to which I refer is a time preferential discount, that is, to what degree does an individual discount the value of goods in the future, relative to the value of the same goods in the present. Even if there were no inflation, people value present consumption over future consumption, present income over future income, and present goods over future goods. The degree to which they discount the future in favor of the present is their effective discount rate, and this discount rate based on time preference guides their decision making with respect to future-oriented activity: consumption, production, leisure, etc.

At its root, interest is fundamentally the price of present goods in terms of future goods.

# Any individual proclaiming to have a negative time preference would, without hesitation, loan you all of his money today in exchange for the same sum tomorrow, at which time he would, without hesitation, loan it all to you, again. He would starve to death, always preferring to eat a meal tomorrow, rather than today.

McCainomics

June 25th, 2008

orc-mccain2.jpg

As if to say, “I can spend other people’s money as well as anyone,” and of course, not to be out-promised by Obama, presidential hopeful John McCain recently offered his pledge of $300 Million to the developer of a cheaper and more efficient electric car battery.

The question I posed about Obama’s promises to the auto industry is just as applicable here:

I wonder what it feels like, to be able to pledge Peter’s money to Paul, with no consequences or accountability. Just wondering.

Pledging other people’s money is, quite simply, the wrong way to go about anything.  It is a $300-million promise to point a gun at you, at me, at everyone.  A promise to steal from each and every one of us, in order for some lucky engineer to get rich.

News flash: the first engineer who develops such a product is going to get really stinking rich, anyways. And I don’t mean drives-a-Cadillac-and-has-four-bathrooms-in-his-house rich.  I’m talking about wipes-his-ass-with-$100-bills rich. Shits-caviar rich.

We don’t need John McCain promising to make him (or her) even more rich.

Over at Cafe Hayek, Don Boudreaux wonders:

Perhaps part of Sen. McCain’s health-care proposals will be to offer a taxpayer-funded prize of $300 million to whoever invents a safe pill that cures cancer.

Boudreaux was interviewed by the Denver Post’s David Harsany, and in an op-ed piece, the two highlight the importance of the market’s allocative function, in determining where, how, and in what proportion to one another will scarce resources be used, and towards what ends they will be put. Harsanyi opines thusly:

McCain makes it seem that a cure for oil is just beyond our grasp. Around $300 million away.

Such is the hubris of central planning. The “$300 million” figure is probably about as arbitrary as arbitrary can be. There are several problems:

  1. Either $300 million is too much in which case the same technology (or a substitute technology) could be developed more efficiently without government’s ham-fisted intervention.
  2. Or $300 million is not enough in which case the grant distorts the market, and subsidizes the profitability which the market doesn’t need.

In either case, the lure of $300 million funnels resources away from otherwise productive activities, making it difficult for substitutions to emerge because their competition receives federal subsidy.

Bad economics is bad news and it makes bad policy. But by far the most objectionable aspect of McCain’s proposal is not that he should’ve flunked Econ 101, but rather that the pledge is a $300 million gun.

Credit Card Scams Part IV: The Penalty Rate Scam

June 20th, 2008

Among the other scams perpetrated by credit card issuers, the Penalty Rate Scam is equally nefarious. All of the scams implemented by credit card issuers work in lock-step with at least one of the other scams.

  1. Debt Collection Practices & Impropriety
  2. The Reverse Payment Prioritization Scam
  3. The Balance Transfer Scam
  4. The Penalty Rate Scam
  5. Exploiting Ignorance: Money for Nothing

Under the terms of most (all?) credit card use agreements, the borrower accepts a default of Penalty Rate which goes in to effect in the event that borrower is late in remitting a single payment. The Penalty Rate is usually the maximum allowed by law, and often in excess of 24%. I have seen or heard of Penalty Rates as high as 29.99% but I suspect that in some jurisdictions they might be even higher.

It could be argued that there is justification for the Penalty Rate, as borrowers who are late or miss a payment are greater default risks. This very well may be true, but suffers from some variant of the post hoc, ergo propter hoc logical fallacy.

  1. Borrower misses a payment
  2. …
  3. Borrower defaults

Did you see what happened there? They intentionally left out the interim step; the one where the borrower’s rate jumps from 9% to 25%, doubling or tripling the interest portion of the monthly payment!

This causes a negative feedback loop: If someone is diligently trying to pay down a credit card balance, paying $300 each month when the minimum payment was $150, the new, penalty minimum payment amount will be approximately $300. This effectively relegates the borrower to making interest-only payments (i.e., no amortization, whatsoever) for the duration which the Penalty Rate is in effect. This may be for a period of six months or longer. During this time, the borrower may continue to make payments in the amount which his or her budget permits, but is unable to reduce his balance in any meaningful manner.

The ability to repay or to pay down the balance is without a doubt negatively impacted by the imposition of a Penalty Rate.

I submit that the Penalty Rate, by itself might be sufficient cause for a large proportion of defaults. Before objecting, think on the margin: any borrower who was scraping by, is now unable to scrape by. These borrowers who would’ve been OK, had they tightened their belt, are now forced into default by the new, higher interest rate.  Theory dictates that the Penalty Rate is indisputably a prime contributing factor to default.

When analyzing data through extrapolated variables, there will always be an unusually strong correlation between the new variable, and the definitional components thereof. It is of paramount importance to avoid making value judgments or inferring causal relationships under such circumstances. There may well be a causal relation between a single missed payment and default, but the noise-to-signal ratio here is about a billion to one. Since the Penalty Rate has a 1:1 correlation with default (by definition, default always occurs after the imposition of the Penalty Rate) there is simply no way to know what the true default rate would be if the penalty were less onerous.

Under more proper loan provisions, there is usually a penalty for late payment, but it is almost never usurious (frequent readers of this blog will recognize that I rarely use this term, and then only carefully). Credit card companies seem to do everything they can to encourage default.

The Penalty Rate works in tandem with the Debt Collection Scam: interest and penalties pile up in order that the lender can claim a larger debt than would otherwise be due. This new debt bears no relationship whatsoever to any anticipated return on investment primarily because there was never any investment to begin with. The higher debt, now in default, is the starting point for any negotiations, arbitrations or legal action.  In essence, the creditor creates phantom debt which is treated by the courts and by corrupt arbitrators as valid. This is not about earning a fair return on borrowed money, it’s about exploiting people’s ignorance and subsidizing interest-free loans to people who don’t need them, none of which would be possible in a free market where debt couldn’t be created out of thin air.

no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics