no third solution

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Credit Card Scams Part I: Debt Collection Practices

June 16th, 2008

Updated: This began as a single post, but started the thought process on a series of scams perpetrated by credit card companies.

  1. Debt Collection Practices & Impropriety
  2. The Reverse Payment Prioritization Scam
  3. The Balance Transfer Scam
  4. The Penalty Rate Scam
  5. Exploiting Ignorance: Money for Nothing

A recent article in Business Week highlights some apparently (IMO) improper practices used by credit-card issuers in collecting debts. Most of them use one of several private arbitration companies. The Business Week article, Banks vs. Consumers (Guess Who Wins?) implies that the National Arbitration Forum is probably up to no good and cites a number of business practices that lend (no pun intended), at the very least, the appearance of impropriety.

What if a judge solicited cases from big corporations by offering them a business-friendly venue in which to pursue consumers who are behind on their bills?

…[T]hat’s essentially how one of the country’s largest private arbitration firms operates. The National Arbitration Forum (NAF) … specializes in resolving claims by banks, credit-card companies, and major retailers that contend consumers owe them money. Often without knowing it, individuals agree in the fine print of their credit-card applications to arbitrate any disputes over bills rather than have the cases go to court.

Of course, most of the article is circumstantial fluff, that could very well be taken out of context or could be outliers to reality. I do, however, find it alarming that NAF rules in debtors’ favor only 0.2% of the time. That number strikes me as exceedingly one-sided. Then again, the creditors routinely dismiss arbitrators who are known or assumed to be unbiased debtor-friendly.

One former arbitrator for NAF “said that after she awarded a consumer $48,000 in damages in a collections case, the firm removed her from 11 other cases.”

…”[B]oth sides in each case have the right to object to one arbitrator suggested by NAF, based on the arbitrator’s professional biography, which is provided to the parties. Creditors had simply exercised that option with [that arbitrator.]”

Of course there is some serious assymetry here: the creditors see hundreds or thousands of cases; they have the information necessary to dismiss anyone suspected of not handing down favorable judgments.

The article also mentioned that creditors like to tack on fees for hunting down delinquent debts. What the creditor is saying, is that “You have defaulted on your debt, so I am going to (in a pretty arbitrary fashion) declare that you owe me more than you really do,” in order that you pay them more money. What I say, is that the creditor should have already priced the risk of default, and charged the population of its debtors a sufficient aggregate interest rate to cover that risk profitably.

Creditors make money on the fact that most people do everything they can to avoid default until its the only option available. When they miss payments, they are assessed late payment fees, and/or a penalty interest rate. This means that for many months, sometimes years, they make the bare minimum payment. Assessing fees for the collection of past-due debts strikes me as unconscionable, primarily because (and this may be semantics) the default risk should already be provided for in the interest rate charged on the debt.

My hypothesis, unfounded as it is, is that creditors are preying on most people’s willingness to honor their agreements, they know that most people will continue to try and pay the debt as assessed, and eventually when a compromise is struck, it will be determined on the basis of the higher balance including the spurious fees and penalties. I suppose debtors “agreed” to this in the fine print, but in practice, by the time an account is delinquent enough to be handed to a debt-collector, hundreds or thousands of dollars in late fees and penalties have already been tacked on to the amount due. The borrower has defaulted on an unsecured line of credit. Creditors at this point should be pretty much out-of-luck.

Let’s look at an example. I’ve heard that the average debtor has something like $10K in unsecured credit card debt.

Someone with a $10,000 balance, and an interest rate of 17.99%, assuming a minimum payment of accrued interest + $20 will have a minimum payment of $170 due. Assuming they can afford to pay the minimum plus an additional $50 in principle, over the course of a year, this individual will have paid $2,570 to the creditor, but he has reduced his balance due by only $770. At this rate, it will take him 12 years and $21,000 to pay off his balance. If the individual is really aggressive in his payback plan, eats nothing but Ramen noodle, walks to work, and doesn’t miss a payment, he might pay something like $500/month. At the end of the year, he has paid $6,000 in order to reduce his balance by $4153. At this rate, it takes him 24 months and $12,000 to pay off his balance.

If, on the other hand, this individual misses a payment halfway through the year, and is assessed a modest late fee of $50 and a penalty interest rate of 24.99%, at the end of the first year he has paid approximately $3002 to his creditors, and has only reduced his balance by $498. When you really break it down like this, I think it’s in the debtors best interest to tell the credit card issuer that you are simply unable to pay back that debt, please destroy my credit and never call me again. It’s probably easier to deal with whatever happens to one’s credit score, than it is to spend 12 years trying to pay off that debt.

These problems are compounded by the fact that (in Michigan and I presume in other states) unsecured debt is really quasi-secure. If debtor defaults on a credit agreement, the creditor can, at its discretion, seek a default judgment in a state court. Such a judgment can be filed with the register of deeds in any county in the state, and acts as a valid lien upon real property the debtor owns or comes to own subsequent the date of judgment. Such encumbrance will prohibit the debtor from realizing capital gains on the sale of real property up to the amount of the lien, or from refinancing to take cash out of an equitable position.

I don’t really have a whole lot of advice to offer people in these situations, but I’ll give it a try:

Unfortunately, you probably have to declare bankruptcy in order to repudiate debt like this. You can walk away from a secure debt like a mortgage, but I’m not sure you can walk away from the debt on your Best Buy credit card. The creditor will probably garnish your wages (can they do this?) or file a lien against your real property (jurisdiction permitting).

My advice would be to 1) immediately destroy the card, cash advance checks, etc., call and cancel the card. This is difficult to do, because they don’t want to lose your revenue stream. Resist the offers of 0% balance transfers for six months (to be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent post). Resist any offers to keep the account open. You will probably be transferred to three or four individuals, each of whom will give you greater resistance. Cancel the card. Then establish a budget for yourself, and a repayment schedule (this will be daunting). If you have a good credit history, you may be able to work something out with the creditors. Tell them that you are trying to pay off your debt but given current conditions are unable to. At the end of the day you are dealing with people, not robots, treat them politely and ask for concessions: a lower interest rate, a compromise on the balance due, etc. If you can take out a consolidation loan, do it, but under no circumstances should you take out any additional advances, open any new lines of credit, etc.

Trial by Jury

June 16th, 2008

In celebration of Magna Carta day, Francois Tremblay quotes one of my favorite writers, Lysander Spooner, from his essay, Trial by Jury:

FOR more than six hundred years – that is, since Magna Carta, in 1215 – there has been no clearer principle of English or American constitutional law, than that, in criminal cases, it is not only the right and duty of juries to judge what are the facts, what is the law, and what was the moral intent of the accused; but that it is also their right, and their primary and paramount duty, to judge of the justice of the law, and to hold all laws invalid, that are, in their opinion, unjust or oppressive, and all persons guiltless in violating, or resisting the execution of, such laws.

Unless such be the right and duty of jurors, it is plain that, instead of juries being a “palladium of liberty “- a barrier against the tyranny and oppression of the government – they are really mere tools in its hands, for carrying into execution any injustice and oppression it may desire to have executed.

But for their right to judge of the law, and the justice of the law, juries would be no protection to an accused person, even as to matters of fact; for, if the government can dictate to a jury any law whatever, in a criminal case, it can certainly dictate to them the laws of evidence. That is, it can dictate what evidence is admissible, and what inadmissible, and also what force or weight is to be given to the evidence admitted. And if the government can thus dictate to a jury the laws of evidence, it can not only make it necessary for them to convict on a partial exhibition of the evidence rightfully pertaining to the case, but it can even require them to convict on any evidence whatever that it pleases to offer them.

This sounds like the modern-day arguments in favor of jury nullification. I’ve previously noted that when the state acts “‘in defiance of the rule of law,’ then we can certainly presume that the law — either as written, interpreted, and/or enforced — is unjust. When the law is wrong, the last line of defense is the individual who refuses to aid in its enforcement,” and further that if the individual juror is not seen as the final arbiter of justice, then he is incapable of judging what is right or wrong. If the individual “can’t define justice, then no group of men can collectively define justice. If a man can’t define justice, neither can the State,” since it is merely a group of men acting more-or-less in concert, that is to say, jury nullification is the only moral option.

Was Spooner some sort of clairvoyant? Could he see the abuses that the government would one day perpetrate? No, but he was able to see through rhetoric, and use reason as well as anyone. Through the application of right reason, he could predict (or forewarn) the consequences that necessarily follow from certain actions. Spooner’s accusations are surprisingly true, to this day. For instance, he describes a government which can “dictate what evidence is admissable…” and “require [a jury] to convict on any evidence whatever.” Is this so far from the truth? After all, the accused is innocent until proven guilty, right?

In many regards, not really. The law enforcement officers are in many instances able to determine the sentences ex ante, because they control one side of the “crime” for which the victim is being charged. The magnitude of the sentence is often determined by the “crime,” and the government agents determine with what “crime(s)” a person will be charged. Furthermore, a person who fights a federal charge must, by law, receive a harsher sentence than someone who accepts a guilty plea. This is a perfect storm of totalitarianism: coerced plea-bargains, entrapment, and laws which bend to the will of the enforcers.

Blight

June 2nd, 2008

Let’s say you and several neighbors live near an eyesore. If you don’t like the maintenance of that property, you should do it yourself. This means that the several of you could pitch together to purchase the blighted property, and transform it into something useful like a park or open space for your common enjoyment. But he fears, as we’ve seen, that zoning laws prevent people from improving their lots (no pun intended) individually, or collectively. If the current owner held allodial title, or a claim to allodial title, instead of the quasi-feudal title we refer to as “fee simple”, this would not be a problem. But because of land patents, through which the government declares its violent intentions against all contest, you can’t acquire allodial title.

A friend of mine lives next door to what could properly be described as “blighted” property. It is a 60+ year old dwelling in serious disrepair: there are no appliances, the garage is falling over and is a likely haven for rats, the floors and walls show signs of damage throughout, it was once home to no less than 7 dogs and several cats, and bears the telltale smell of urine that is always present where people neglect to properly train, care for, or clean up after their pets. The previous tenant has been foreclosed on, and the house sits vacant, with a list price of perhaps half of what my friend paid for his adjacent house, about 7 years ago. Even at this price, it is probably overvalued.

My friend has considered trying to purchase this adjacent parcel and combine lots, rather than sell his own house and move elsewhere. Doing so would allow him to expand and remodel his own house, and provide a larger yard for his daughter, his dogs, and entertaining. Unfortunately, he’s afraid that our municipality may very well not let him combine lots, because in doing so the tax base decreases.

Contrast these scenarios with what governments routinely do: If you want to improve the neighborhood, it’s nearly impossible to do so. If the government wants to “improve the neighborhood” (or enrich its patrons), it simply shuts off the utilities and declares the properties blighted, and then “reclaims” them under the principle of eminent domain. If, as an individual, you sabotaged your neighbors plumbing and then tried to take his property, you’d be branded a criminal. When government does it, we call it “urban renewal”.

no third solution

Blogging about liberty, anarchy, economics and politics