Apologies, it’s kind of long….Yesterday, Kip posed a very interesting question. My first inclination was to disagree, but he made some very good points. But I think I’ve come back around to my initial dissent.

Does a child conceived by artificial insemination, in accordance with an agreement whereby at least one of the parties wishes to remain anonymous, have a right, or some sort of claim on the identity of his parents? It’s probably an inevitable part of the human condition, the curiosity that would lead one to seek the donor who wished to remain anonymous, but the fact of the matter is that these children do grow up in “families” that are not dissimilar to families that occur naturally, without the assistance of frozen swimmers and glass beakers.

Kip suggests that the children in these instances have a fundamental right to know who their parents are – and as far as I can tell, it is based derivatively on the principle that a contract between two parties cannot violate the rights of a third party. But this argument seems at the very least, somewhat circular. I would rebut that a third party’s narcissistic curiosity cannot be used as the basis for violating the terms and conditions of a contract made between two other parties – especially when the very interest of the said third party was created by the contract. In geneneral, I’d agree with Kip’s assertion. But in this application, where the two parties are combining to create the third party, the very party who is claiming a grievance – I think it’s an apples-to-cinderblocks comparison, and accordingly, I will refrain from calling this circumstance an “exception to the rule.”

Does this right to appease one’s curiosity apply also to anonymous philanthropic donations? Or to other agreements wherein one party benefits as a result of an anonymous outsider(s)? If Kip’s argument, that a child upon reaching maturity, has a fundamental right to know who his parents are, does that “right” apply to the product of other relationships? Consider: no child can ever be “certain” of the identity of his biological parents without the performance of a definitive DNA test – can he subject them to this test to satisfy his desire for certainty (for whatever reason)?

I would suggest not. Even standard fertilization method, by which I mean coitus provides no guaranty with regards to the donor of the seed. In the event that a child had a suspected father (fathers?) I suppose he could sue them and compel the evidence – and as a result he may or may not end up with a satisfactory answer to his paternal question. The genetic makeup alone doesn’t constitute fatherhood, so what we’re left with is violating the contract of anonymity to appease someone else’s curiosity, for it can serve no other end.

And I think the anonymity, as a condition in Kip’s initial inquiry is of utmost importance. Because a child won’t have any evidence that suggests fatherhood, he won’t be able to compel a DNA test from anyone, without casting some sort of ridiculosity that involves compelling DNA tests from the population of the known world.

That the benefactors of such a donation (the child produced therefrom) are the recipients of life is not to be ignored. Without the anonymous donor, and without the gift of life, these children wouldn’t have an anonymous father to pursue, no alarms would be sounded, no purported violations or infringments of rights could possibly occur.

The fact of the matter is that many people donate to these banks on condition of anonymity, and I believe the same is true for egg donors. It is a simple matter of revealed preference that a great many people who currently donate, or who have donated in the past, would probably stop doing so – afterall, if anonymity wasn’t their concern they wouldn’t take measures to ensure it, and the market wouldn’t have developed clinics that promise the same to their donors.

We can very easily prevent this sort of “tort,” by placing a ban on anonymous donations to sperm/egg banks. I know this is not what Kip was suggesting, but it’s easy to cut off the nose to spite the face. By essentially rendering void all contracts containing an anonymity clause, the judiciary has accomplished what an outright ban would’ve achieved through legislation. I think this is convincingly a situation wherein the negative externality effect of this sort of legislation would seem apparent to anyone.

Sometimes, you just have to be grateful for what you’ve got.